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Copy No. 2
16 April 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community
THROUGH: Chief, Product Review Division
SUBJECT: Completion of Intelligence Exercise

1. This is a preliminary report on the three-phase Intelligence Exercise on Post-Tito Yugoslavia, concluded yesterday. It reflects only the views of the PRD action officers. A much more detailed report, coordinated with the participants, will be submitted to you in about 2 weeks. Several participants have kept diaries, which they will make available to us in the meantime.

2. First, a little self-criticism: The exercise would have gone more smoothly but for the inexperience of the controllers, particularly myself. As one DIA participant put it, "we were not really sure at times who was in charge of this thing." Of course there was, by design, some division of labor between ourselves and the NIOs. But the DIA objection has some validity. Obviously we paid a price in running an exercise ourselves (especially for the first time), rather than entrusting it to full-time gaming specialists.

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3. Secondly, [] and I now recognize that rapid conferencing set-up procedures need further work before they can be useful to the Community. Apart from the unavailability of CONTEXT--which was embarrassing--we found that the Meet-Me-Bridge was uncomfortable for three of the five participants. It took nearly a half-hour to get everyone into the Bridge and talking smoothly, despite a special rehearsal the day before involving three of the participants.

4. The OCI analyst commented to [] that the Bridge, once in operation, did speed coordination considerably. We should score one for our side, but also bear in mind that there were some two dozen participants in Phase II (the Community Conference). The Meet-Me-Bridge, at present capacity, carries no more than 6 stations. [] of NSA is surely correct in saying that the Meet-Me-Bridge can only be an interim measure until CONTEXT is finally available.

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5. The exercise was designed to expose procedural problems, and at least one was exposed almost indecently. At Phases I and II we warned the participants that we thought the Pentagon might have difficulty in handling especially sensitive material in timely fashion. To start Phase III, near the close of business on 14 April, I LDXed to INR, DIA and NSA the simulated scenario. Simultaneously I delivered the scenario to the participants in this building, and also handed a copy to Jim Hanrahan of the Strategic Warning Staff, who happened to be in CIA Headquarters for the regular Monday afternoon NIO meeting. All this was accomplished by 1715. By noon on 15 April, that is, well into the intelligence production part of the exercise, the LDX operators at the Pentagon had not notified the intended recipients in DIA and SWS that the material had even arrived. Instead, the individual who acts as a controller of such sensitive material had, in the words of one of the DIA participants, "carted it off to a vault somewhere." Of course Hanrahan showed his copy of the scenario to the right people when he returned to the Pentagon. [redacted] in disgust, refers to the present LDX system as the Suck and Blow System; i.e., too often an analyst at one end has to tell the analyst at the other to start drawing out as soon as the first analyst pushes in.

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6. We were told by the NIO and the OCI analyst of two unexpected substantive by-products of this exercise. [redacted]

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[redacted] Also, the SWS prepared a checklist of indicators of possible Soviet intent to intervene in Yugoslavia, which the NIO describes as "right on" and worth retention (see attachment).

7. There was also a substantive gain in a negative sense. We accumulated fresh evidence of the lack of available information on US-Yugoslav bilateral contacts. We have already alerted you to this problem in general terms; we will include chapter and verse in the final, coordinated report.

8. The NIO decided not to issue an Exercise Alert Memorandum for several technical and substantive reasons. DIA prepared an Exercise DIN, and we also have seen an Exercise WHSR and the Exercise NIB piece (the latter was coordinated on the Meet-Me-Bridge). These sample products, and the evaluation of them, will also form part of the final report.

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Attachment - As stated [redacted]

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